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Abstract: The RAINS model is used to calculate cost minimising abatement policies subject to 
European-wide spatial restrictions on pollution. The principle for choosing environmental targets for the 
1994 Oslo Protocol was closing a gap between benchmark- and critical loads for each grid with a 
uniform percentage. During the negotiations for the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol accumulated eco-
systems exceedances was adapted as basis for gap closure, and overshooting of the constraints allowed 
as an option, provided compensation could be found within the same country. A theoretical discussion 
of this compensation mechanism is provided. A simulation study, using the full RAINS model, of the 
impact of different levels of targets for troublesome Norwegian grids is presented, and results in the 
form of changes in accumulated acidity excesses and costs for the participating countries are reported. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Concerns about acidification of the environment caused by air pollutants crossing international 
borders grew in Europe in the late 60s, and was an important topic at the first United Nations 
conference on the human environment that took place in Stockholm in 1972. Empirical work on a 
European atmospheric transportation model started as an OECD project in the same year. The 
programme was later taken over by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) in 
1979 under the Convention on Long - Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) to reduce air 
pollution in Europe. International cooperation from the early 70s to solve trans-boundary air 
pollution problems in Europe led to the development of the Regional Acidification INformation 
and Simulation model, or RAINS for short, at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria (see Alcamo et al., 1990 for the first general presentation).  
 
The RAINS model basically integrates an atmospheric transportation model, the EMEP model,  
(see Eliassen and Saltbones (1983) for the start and Tarrason et al. (1998) for an update) linking 
the emissions from countries as sources of pollution to the deposition of pollutants at receptors, 
with purification cost functions for the emission sources at a country level. The EMEP model 
distinguishes the spatial pattern of deposition over Europe using as receptors a grid mash with a 
150x150 km resolution. The model can be used for scenario analyses and to derive cost-effective 
European wide reductions of emissions. In this latter “optimisation mode”, environmental 
objectives are linked to acid deposition by formulating standards in terms of depositions for each 
grid-cell. The present RAINS model deals with emissions of sulphur, nitrogen, ammonia and 
volatile organic substances as well as modelling the formation of ground level ozone (see Amann et 
al., 1998b), and can be used to address, in addition to acidification problems created by sulphur 
and nitrogen, also problems with eutrophication and ground level ozone. The latest development is 
to cover fine particles so related health problems might be studied (cf. www.iiasa.ac.at).  
 
An innovative feature of the RAINS optimisation version used for the Oslo Protocol was the 
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introduction of Critical Loads as environmental standards. Critical loads reflect, for a given 
ecosystem, the maximum amount of acid deposition at which no significant environmental damage 
is expected in the long run according to present knowledge, i.e. ecosystems should function 
normally as to reproduction and biomass stability (see Nilsson, 1986). The background analyses 
for the 1994 Oslo Second Sulphur Protocol soon revealed that it was not feasible to use critical 
loads as strict environmental standards. More relaxed targets for deposition loads of receptors 
had to be formulated. The principles for formulating such target loads became crucial as to fairness 
in a multinational setting of consensus decisions (see Tuinstra et al. (1999) for a record of the 
discussion). Finally, the principle of closing the gap between the critical loads and some 
benchmark deposition levels with a uniform percentage was chosen; the gap closure principle, 
which aims for an equal relative reduction of excess deposition for all grid-cells2.  
 
But also when using the gap closure approach, it was quickly recognized that optimised cost-
effective solutions might depend on the constraints of very few, in the extreme case on only one,  
grid-cell. In view of the uncertainty attached to the critical load levels involved in the environmental 
constraints, in order to aim for more robust optimisation results when negotiating the 1999 
“Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone”, the basic 
optimisation problem was reformulated by introducing a compensation mechanism  (introduced 
in the Fourth Interim Report to the European Commission, DG-XI, February 1998, and 
developed further in the fifth and sixth interim reports, see Amann et al., 1998a,b). Over-shooting 
of grid targets was allowed provided compensation could be found within the same country.  Such 
a compensation mechanism softened the spatial inflexibility of the environmental objectives for 
receptors that was essentially driving the basic model solution3.   
 
However, even with this compensation mechanism two grid -cells in Southern Norway made a 
solution with otherwise preferred targets infeasible when IIASA was preparing background 
                                                             
2 The Norwegian meteorologist Anton Eliassen introduced the idea. 
3 A feasible solution with a very dominating constraint (for Germany) triggered the development of the 
compensation mechanism (personal communication from Markus Amann). 
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documentation for the 22nd session of the Task Force on Integrated Assessment Modelling in 
1998. Initially these troublesome targets were neglected. The Norwegian Ministry of Environment 
requested some alternative simulations so that more reasonable targets for Norway could be 
established. The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical discussion as well as to report on 
the simulation runs on how the compensation mechanism worked in the case of the Norwegian 
grids. In the theoretical Section 2 we will use a pedagogical version of the RAINS model, as 
presented in Førsund (1999b), focussing just on a single pollutant (e.g. SO2). However, we 
believe that the basic principles will be exposed within such a simplified framework. 
Generalisations can be done more or less straightforwardly. The different gap closure principles 
used is reviewed, and average accumulated exceedances introduced in the basic model. The 
compensation mechanism is introduced in Section 3. A theoretical discussion of this mechanism is 
provided, including showing how conditions for optimality change using the mechanism. The 
simulation runs using the full RAINS model, of the impact of different levels of targets for 
Norwegian grids is presented in Section 4, and results in the form of changes in accumulated 
acidity excesses and costs for the participating countries are reported. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Basic RAINS Model 
 
The optimisation approach of the RAINS model used for background analyses during the 
negotiation process of the Oslo Protocol reflects the overall environmental policy objectives by 
specifying constraints on the maximum deposition. A cost-effective cooperative solution is then 
obtained by finding a spatial pattern of emissions that minimise total emission control costs over 
countries as sources, measured in a common currency (Euro) for the countries involved, that meet 
the specified constraints on deposition. The model version that is used for the simulation studies 
encompasses emissions of sulphur, nitrogen, ammonia, and volatile organic compounds, and 
addresses the environmental problems of acidity, eutrophication and ground-level ozone in each 
grid-cell. In order to bring out the essence of the change from “hard” environmental constraints to 
“soft” ones by introducing the compensation mechanism we will simplify the large-scale computer 
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model by using one pollutant only4, and specify a smooth purification cost function. The model 
structure is shown by the formal optimisation problem corresponding to the type of model used for 
the background scenarios for the Oslo Protocol: 
 )eoi ,ei - e
o
i(ci
N
1=i
  ei åMin
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where ci(.) is the control, or purification5, cost function for country i (i=1,..,N),  eio is the 
reference emission from country i, ei the emission, aij the atmospheric unit transportation 
coefficient from country (source) i to receptor j (j=1,..,R) (i.e., the EMEP grid-cells with a 
150x150 km resolution in the RAINS model), bj the background deposition and the variables dj* 
reflect the environmental objectives specified as deposition targets. The model is static, but the 
reference emissions are for a future year and based on projections for use of different types of 
energy, agricultural activity, transportation, and some industrial process-industry activities. The 
best practice purification technology of today is assumed also to hold for the future year. Thus the 
RAINS model is used for exploring cost efficient allocations of emission reductions for a future 
year (e.g. 2010). 
 
The reference emission, eio, is shown explicitly in the cost function to enable an analysis of the 
impacts of changing these references. The formulation is also suitable for representing the actual 
piecewise linear cost function in the RAINS model (see e.g. Førsund, 1999b). The reference 
emissions are also present in the constraints on emissions, thus being crucial for the occurrence of 
                                                             
4 The reader may note that the joint interaction of sulphur and nitrogen in the creation of acidity is not 
represented, neither the non-linear ozone formation process. 
5 Purification costs are used instead of the expression control costs or abatement cost to remind the reader 
that abatement in the form of reducing the production of goods generating emissions, or structural changes as 
changes in fuel mix, e.g. substitution of natural gas for coal, are not considered in the RAINS model. 
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infeasible solutions. We will return to this below discussing the solution to problem (1). 
 
Gap closure principles 
The environmental objectives, dj*, are connected to the critical loads (CL), and   they were 
originally termed target loads in the negotiation process (see Tuinstra et al., 1999).  The 
calculations of target loads are based on the 1990 depositions as benchmark depositions, djo, and 
the critical load for the ecosystems in each grid . The Coordination Center for Effects6, which is a 
part of the LRTAP body, calculates the critical loads.  
 
However, different principles have been used to calculate the targets (see Posch et al. (1999) and 
(2001) for definitions and a discussion of the principles). For the Oslo Protocol the principle was 
closing the gap between the benchmark deposition and the critical load for a grid. Other principles 
introduced later have been ecosystem area gap closure and average accumulated exceedance 
gap closure. The different principles are illustrated in Figure 1. The grid -cell is assumed to have 
eight eco-systems, and they are ordered according to increasing value of CL. The horizontal bars 
for each system from the vertical axis to the CL-values represents the eco-system areas. The CL 
cumulative distribution function is represented by the bold step-curve in Figure 1. Grid -cells may 
actually contain from a few to several thousands of eco-systems. (The most problematic 
Norwegian grid has 112 eco-systems.) The main types are forests of different tree species, lakes, 
grassland, bogs, moors, and tundra7.   
 
To apply a deposition gap closure principle the CL for the grid-cell has to be defined. It has been 
usual to define the CL for a grid-cell by having five percent of eco-system area unprotected. Let 
us assume that eco-system No.1 has an area share of five percent. The CL for eco-system No. 2 
in the figure then determines the CL for the whole grid-cell. The gap to be closed with a given 
fraction (or percentage), x , is (do – CL2). The target deposition will then be  
                                                             
6 See Posch et al. (1995), Posch et al. (1997), Posch et al. (1999). 
7 Details of distribution of types of eco-systems on countries and area covered are found in Amann et al. 
(1998b) and Hettelingh et al. (2001). 
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Figure 1. Gap closure principles 
 
 
d* = (1-x) (do – CL2). In Figure 1 a gap closure of about x = 1/3 has been used, resulting in 
deposition d*, protecting systems 5 and 6 in addition to 7 and 8 already protected at deposition 
level do. 
 
A weakness with this principle is that the CL value representing the whole grid depends on only 
one observation on the CL distribution curve, and the resulting target load d* is also one point on 
the curve. For different shapes of the CL distribution curve, but going through both the same CL 
grid value and the benchmark deposition value, do, we may then have quite different eco-system 
area protection.  
 
The area gap closure principle focuses on reducing the unprotected area with a certain percentage. 
The percentage unprotected area in a grid is the share of the ecosystem area where the critical 
loads are less than the deposition. Let Aij be the area of eco-system i in grid-cell j, and let Sj be 
the set of eco-systems in grid-cell j. We will partition this set into the unprotected eco-
systems, { }dCLidS ijj <=- :)( , and the protected systems, { }dCLidS ijj ³=+ :)(  and obviously 
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we have jjj SSS =È
+-
.  In Figure 1 the ecosystems 1 to 6 belong to the unprotected set at the 
benchmark deposition level do, and eco-systems 7, 8 belong to the protected set. Eco-system 
area gap closure is usually interpreted as finding the deposition, d*, that corresponds to a given 
percentage, x, reduction of unprotected area at a benchmark deposition, do. Using our notation it 
means finding the maximal level of deposition d* satisfying:  
 å å
- +Î Î
-£
)( )(*
)1(
jj
o
jjdSi dSi
ijij AxA  
 
In Figure 1 eco-systems 5 and 6 have about 45% of the total area of systems 1-6. Applying  a 
gap closure fraction of e.g. 0.4 results in protecting systems 5 and 6, i.e. more than 40%, and 
corresponds to a deposition exactly equal to the CL of system 5. It is regarded as a weakness of 
the principle (see Posch et al., 2001) that since the CL distribution curve is a step curve, equality 
will in general not hold in the equation above when calculating target depositions, d*.  This means 
that target depositions may vary over grid-cells also located in different countries, which may 
create problems of fairness. Also left out is the distribution of the degree of excess of depositions 
over eco- systems, it is just a question of protected or unprotected eco- systems. 
 
The average accumulated exceedance principle focuses on the exceedances in each eco-system of 
a grid-cell. In Figure 1, the deposition of do represents an excess over critical loads in systems 1 to 
6, as illustrated by the broken line extension of the area bar for eco-system 5. For a formal 
definition of the average accumulated exceedance for a grid-cell, consider an ecosystem, i, in 
grid-cell j. The excess for eco-system i, EXij 0³ , is the difference between actual deposition, dj 
and the CLij, and the average accumulated exceedance, AAEj, is calculated by weighing each 
eco-system excess with eco-system area share: 
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A j is the total eco-system area of grid-cell j. The minimum CL is the CL for the first eco-system, 
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i.e. No. 1 in Figure 1, since CL is the cumulative distribution function. In Figure 1 systems 1 to 6 
contribute to exceedance illustrated by the continuation of the area bars with broken lines from the 
CL- values up to the do level, while systems 7 and 8 obtain the value of zero in the second 
expression in (2). There is a one to one correspondence between average accumulated 
exceedances and deposition do through the AAE-function for deposition values above the 
minimum CL of a grid-cell’s eco-systems8. This value is indicated on the horizontal axis in the 
figure as AAE(do). It is measured in the same units as depositions, and obviously we must have 
AAE(do) < do  (as long as do > CL1, see (2)). The target for accumulated excess for a grid-cell, j, 
with x as the gap closure fraction, e.g. expressed as per cent, may be calculated as: 
,,..,1,)()1(* RjdAAExAAE ojjj =-=                                                                             (3) 
which implicitly gives a target also for depositions. As pointed out above there is a unique 
correspondence between depositions and AAE-numbers. Using (2) targets for average 
accumulated exceedance in (3) can be translated to targets for depositions. Assuming d* in Figure 
1 is such a calculated target, the target for average accumulated exceedance, AAE(d*), is 
indicated in the figure. We must have AAE(d*) < AAE(do) for d* < do. 
 
A measure based on average accumulated exceedances of depositions is more robust as to the 
location of the CL-function and also takes into consideration the whole distribution of excess. 
Notice that applying a gap closure to average accumulated exceedances we do not have to use a 
percentile as the lower limit to the critical load; there is no use for the concept of a CL for the 
whole grid. Depositions have to be reduced to a level less or equal to the CL of the most sensitive 
eco-system for no environmental pollution to occur. In the background work for the Gothenburg 
Protocol, the major targeting principle changed from deposition gap closure to   eco-system area 
gap closure and finally to using average accumulated exceedances as the gap to be closed.  But 
notice that it might not be unproblematic to sum  together exceedances in different ecosystems. It 
                                                             
8 It should be mentioned that when addressing acidification in RAINS due to both sulphur and nitrogen 
unique CL values  do not longer exist, but the problem is solved by measuring excess as the shortest distance 
from the deposition point for the substances to the now relevant concept of a critical load function, see Posch 
et al. (1999) and (2001). 
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implies that damages from exceedances are assumed to be directly comparable, as would be the 
case if damages were the same linear function of exceedance for all eco-systems in a grid-cell. 
 
The cost -effective solution 
Introducing the average accumulated exceedances gap closure principle the environmental 
constraint in (1) reads: 
*
1
)()( jj
N
i
iijjjj AAEbeaAAEdAAE £+= å
=
                                                                        (4)  
Using (2) we may convert this constraint into a constraint formulated in depositions as in (1), but 
for a comparison with later development we will use the form (4). The Lagrangian for the cost 
minimisation problem (1) with (4) as constraint may be written:   
   
))((
)(
)(
),(
1
min
1
1 1
*
1
o
i
N
i
iii
N
i
o
iii
R
j
N
i
jjiijjj
o
ii
N
i
o
ii
eee
ee
AAEbeaAAE
eeecL
å
å
å å
å
=
=
= =
=
+--
--
úû
ù
êë
é -+-
--=
g
m
l
                                                                      (5) 
The necessary first order conditions are: 
 N 1,.., = i  ,0aAAE - c    +  - j ii ijj
R
1=j
i =å gml ''                                                                             (6) 
The first term is the marginal purification cost of country i, and the second term is the marginal 
evaluation of depositions resulting from emissions of country i. The term is composed 
multiplicatively of three components; starting from the last this is the deposition per unit of emission 
from country i ending up in grid-cell j, the next component is the marginal impact of this deposition 
on the average accumulated exceedances in grid-cell j, and the last component is the shadow 
price on the environmental constraint for grid -cell j. The shadow prices, lj, on the environmental 
standards in the form of average accumulated excess are in general non-negative and only strictly 
positive if the corresponding constraint is binding. The shadow prices, µi and ig , on the upper and 
lower constraints on emissions from a country cannot both be positive at the same time. If we are 
at the upper boundary µi will be positive and ig  zero, and vice versa at the lower boundary. For 
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an interior solution both are zero. We then have the standard textbook condition: it is necessary 
for an optimal emission level that marginal purification cost equals the total marginal “shadow 
value” of unit depositions. Note that marginal purification costs differ between countries due to the 
country-specific atmospheric dispersion coefficients. 
 
The shadow prices, lj, on average accumulated exceedances constraints are in general interpreted 
as the change in the objective function of a marginal change in the constraint (evaluated at the 
optimal solution). Relaxing a binding constraint will in general improve the optimal value of the 
objective function; in our case it will decrease total purification costs. Tightening the environmental 
standard, i.e., lowering the average accumulated exceedances target,  AAE j*, will impose an 
increased cost in the aggregate on the participating countries. 
 
An infeasible solution to problem (1) means that we cannot find an admissible emission vector that 
satisfies all the constraints. Specifically, even using all purification possibilities to the maximum, 
implying by definition that emissions are set at minimum levels, minie , for all countries, will lead to 
one or more deposition constraints being violated. Using critical loads as target loads within the 
model version used for the Oslo Protocol background studies lead to such an infeasibility, and 
made the development of target loads necessary. However, it should be born in mind that the 
benchmarks, oie , are kept fixed. By reducing these exogenous variables more room is created for 
satisfying constraints, keeping the same targets. Reduced levels may be obtained by restructuring 
the sectoral composition of the economy or simply holding back on economic growth9. 
 
Returning to a feasible solution, if we have dominating upstream-downstream configurations as to 
transboundary flows of pollutants, it is to be expected that many constraints will not be binding, 
i.e. average accumulated exceedances or depositions will be below targets in these grids. Among 
the participants at the UN/ECE task force meetings discussing model results it has been expressed  
 
                                                             
9 This is actually an alternative to using resources on purification. This aspect of the RAINS model is 
addressed in Førsund (1998). 
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concern with the “zero- one” nature of environmental considerations. Only binding constraints 
influence the optimal cost-effective solution, while enjoyment of cleaner environments than 
specified by targets loads does not count. We will return to this point in Section 5. 
 
 
3. Softening hard environmental constraints 
 
The use of the basic model (1) with deposition gap closure soon met with problems of infeasible 
solutions, solutions being driven by just a few environmental constraints, and instability of solutions 
(in the sense that small perturbations in exogenous data would lead to significant changes in the 
spatial distribution of depositions and costs while the value of the objective function remained 
almost the same). Mainly due to cost considerations the negotiating countries was seeking an 
interim solution on the way to the ultimate goal of achieving critical loads everywhere. It turned out 
that even for politically realistic ambition levels when formulating target loads within the gap closing 
mechanism, the model may yield infeasible solutions, as explained above.  
 
The solution to the infeasibility problem when using the RAINS model for negotiating process 
leading to the 1994 Oslo Protocol was to remove grid-cells that caused the infeasibility for an 
otherwise acceptable deposition gap closure level (60%). Such a procedure removes any 
influence of the problem grids on the solution and may be questioned both from a scientific - and 
policy point of view of the concerned countries. 
 
The Compensation Mechanism 
Instead of focussing on environmental targets for individual grids as constraints, the compensation 
mechanism keeps the grid-specific targets for average accumulated exceedances, but as a 
constraint takes the total average excess deposition within a country (or more generally a group). 
A positive a violation in one grid-cell, as illustrated in Figure 1 with AAE(d*) < AAE(do), can be 
compensated by a negative “violation” in another grid. Notice that according to the definition of 
average accumulated exceedances in (2) a deposition below the minimum critical load for the eco-
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systems of a grid-cell cannot be used for compensation. AAE is zero until the minimal CL is 
exceeded. Actual average accumulated exceedances below the target exceedances, AAEj(dj) < 
AAE j*  in gird-cell j, can be used to compensate overshooting the target,  AAEf(df) > AAEf* , in 
another grid -cell, f, of a country. 
 
The arguments put forward for introducing a compensation mechanism as an option varies. Amann 
et al. (1998b) convey the arguments well (p. 99):  
In order to limit the potential influence of small and perhaps untypical environmental receptor areas on 
optimised Europe-wide emission controls and to increase the overall cost-effectiveness of strategies, a 
mechanism was developed to tolerate lower improvements at a few places without discarding the overall 
environmental ambition level. 
 
There are technical concerns like problems of infeasibility and robustness (lack of stability) of a 
solution, and more user-based strategic concerns about a few grid targets driving the solution and 
“holding up” scenarios viewed as more “balanced” or appealing. It is easy to understand less 
enthusiasm for hard targets by delegates from countries not influencing the solution via their own 
targets, but facing the bill for a few targets being fulfilled10. People may feel more comfortable with 
a solution strategy where a number of spatially more balanced restrictions influence the solution. A 
rationale for the specific design of the mechanism may be that countries are more concerned with 
total (harmful) excess deposition within their whole territory than about excess deposition of 
solution on the way to the ultimate goal of achieving critical loads everywhere. 
 
Alternative ways of meeting this problem have been proposed in the literature. Batterman (1992) 
introduced a sub-square approach by grouping ecosystems within a grid-cell into unattainable and 
attainable shares with respect to critical loads at maximal purification. Then relative critical load 
coverage was used for the attainable part, and a deposition reduction goal was introduced for the 
unattainable. 
 
                                                             
10 The feeling of paying “too much” may be misplaced in view of distributions of environmental costs and 
improvements see Wolfgang (2001). 
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Ellis (1988a,b) advocated a multi-objective approach including a weighted sum of deposition 
violations in the objective function, and introducing excess depositions as endogenous variables 
(see Gough et al. (1994) for an exposition). In the latter paper the problem formulation in (1) is 
turned around and weighted exceedances are minimised subject to a total cost constraint and the 
transportation matrix as in (1)11. The weights were called slopes of damage function, and the 
possibility of performing cost benefit analysis is mentioned. However, one should be careful with 
using such a model framework for this latter purpose, see Førsund (1999a) and (2000) for 
clarification. 
 
As mentioned in Section 1 and in Gough et al. (1994) reformulations of how to calculate 
intermediate targets have helped towards relieving problems caused by few binding grids and 
instability. Basing the gap closure on accumulated excess reduces the dependency on single very 
sensitive ecosystems, and reflects better the whole distribution of critical loads, as discussed 
above. 
 
In order to set up the formal model encompassing the compensation mechanism let us allocate 
receptors uniquely to each country (another grouping may easily be used) and for simplicity 
assume that no receptors are shared (this assumption can also easily be generalised). The set Lk is 
the set of receptors within country k, and the sum of receptors over all countries is equal to R. Let 
us further introduce I as the set of  N countries, and M as the set of R receptors. The average 
accumulated exceedances gap closure principle is used. The cost efficient allocation of emissions 
is then found by solving the following problem: 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 This approach has been presented at a succession of meetings in the UNECE Task Force of Integrated 
Assessment Modelling by researchers from SEI (Stockholm Environmental Institute at York). 
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For notational ease the index, j, for grid-cell receptor on the average accumulated exceedances 
function, transportation coefficient and background deposition is kept as before without country 
identification. The R receptor deposition constraints in the basic model (1) are replaced by N 
country balance constraints (in the recent implementation of RAINS, R is of the order of above 
700, and N is about 38). The grid constraints involving the environmental targets, AAEj*, in the 
basic model (1) with (4) as constraints are called “hard” because all grid-cell targets have to be 
satisfied, while using the country balances in model (7) the environmental targets are called “soft” 
because they may be exceeded, provided compensation can be found in other grid-cells. Notice 
that that there is no longer a one to one correspondence between using depositions and 
accumulated exceedances in the environmental constraint as it was for the basic model, unless the 
AAE-functions in (2) are all the same linear function.  
 
 The Lagrangian for the cost-effective allocation model with the compensation mechanism and 
average accumulated exceedances gap closure principle is: 
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The shadow prices for the limits of emissions, µi and ig , have the same interpretation as for the 
basic model. The discussion of these shadow prices is therefore not repeated. Assuming an 
interior solution (i.e., both µi and ig are zero), we see that marginal purification costs should be 
equal to an expression involving sums over the country grids of unit transport coefficients 
multiplied with marginal derivatives of the average accumulated exceedances functions, and then 
multiplied with country shadow price, f k, and summed over countries.  
 
Note that the evaluation of deposition to a grid-cell of country k  is the same for all of its grids. As 
long as the country balance is binding an emission reaching a grid-cell with average accumulated 
exceedances lower than the target has the same shadow cost as emission reaching a grid-cell with 
an excess over the target. Shadow prices of country balance constraints can be interpreted as the 
impact on total purification costs of all countries if the constraint is relaxed marginally, i.e., of a 
marginal increase in the room for violation. As we have set up the Lagrangian function, the impact 
on costs is negative when the violation constraint is relaxed. Using the envelope theorem we have 
that the marginal impact of increasing a target load for a grid within a binding country constraint is 
evaluated at the shadow price of the country balance. A relaxation of a  target for a grid j in 
country k  decreases total purification costs with the amount expressed by the country k balance 
shadow price. The concept of a hot spot characterising a grid -cell with a binding constraint in the 
basic model is replaced by a hot country in the case of only country balances being binding. 
 
We must typically have at least one country balance being binding for environmental 
considerations to influence the solution to problem (7). Shadow prices on country balances are 
only strictly positive if the constraints are binding. For such countries the environmental targets 
only holds on average, and we must have that one or more of the average accumulated 
exceedances targets in the country are violated compared with the basic model, assuming the 
same targets. The country balance cannot typically be binding if no average accumulated 
exceedances targets are exceeded. But notice that one or more targets may be exceeded without 
the country balance constraint being binding.  
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With the compensation mechanism there are no longer shadow prices on the hard constraints on 
average accumulated exceedances targets for individual grid-cells, but shadow prices on the  
country balances instead. To illustrate the difference between the hard and soft constraints models 
let us assume that a country with some binding and some non-binding grid -cell constraints in the 
basic model (1) - with (4) as constraints - now has a binding country balance in model (7) with the 
same targets for grids. The shadow prices that in the basic model consist of zeros and different 
positive numbers will now, with the compensation mechanism, in a way be aggregated to a 
common positive value for all grid -cell average accumulated exceedances. Comparing the 
expressions for total marginal evaluation in (6) and (9), we have that the grid-specific shadow 
prices, lj, in a sense are averaged into country shadow prices, fk, for country k grids. It is 
tempting to conjecture that this average shadow price is lower than the average of the positive 
prices in the basic model, but this may not be the case in general. A shadow price on a country 
balance may also get an extreme value. If only one country had binding grid -cell constraints in the 
basic model, and only one and the same country a binding country balance, and if all target loads 
are the same, then this will be true.  
 
The marginal costs are still country-specific as in the basic model. It is in general the country-
specific atmospheric dispersion coefficients aij that give rise to country-specific marginal costs. 
Whether the differences between marginal costs are larger or smaller in the model with 
compensation mechanism follows the reasoning for the shadow prices above. Actual experience 
with the full-scale model is that decreased purification in one country leads to increased 
purification in other countries with emissions reaching the same countries with binding constraints. 
 
The question may be asked if the solution to the problem with the compensation mechanism 
implies higher overall emissions than in the basic model. However, there is no unique answer to 
this question, and the question is not really interesting within our framework with an emphasis on 
the spatial distribution of deposition. We can state in general that an optimal solution with the same 
grid-cell targets to the basic model (1) is always an admissible solution to model (7), but not vice 
versa. Therefore the solutions with respect to total costs will either be identical (border case), or 
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the model with the compensation mechanism will yield smaller total costs. Intuitively, since the 
objective functions of the two problems (1) and (7) are the same, and the country balances are 
summations of constraints in the basic model (with the average accumulated exceedances 
constraint (4)), for identical depositio n targets in general the total optimised purification costs must 
be less with the compensation mechanism.   
 
Although exceedances for individual eco-systems within a grid is already summed together within 
the accumulated exceedances gap closure approach, one may feel uncomfortable with summing 
together exceedances for different grids belonging to the same country within the compensation 
mechanism. The RAINS model opens for using grid -specific weights on exceedances (see 
Makowski et al. (1998) for details): 
ML  ,Ik  ,B ]   AAE -)b + ea([AAE kk
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                                                       (10) 
where wkj is the weight assigned grid j in country k. The average of the average accumulated 
exceedances used as a constraint may also be generalised to a number different from zero12. The 
balance of country k  is Bk (a positive (negative) number increasing (decreasing) the scope for 
violations). Notice that the introduction of weights, wkj, may be seen as a step towards a damage 
function for grids as is standard in environmental economics (see e.g. Baumol et al., 1988); lake-
grids are weighted relative to forest grids, etc13.  
 
As a further safeguard against unduly exceedences in sensitive grids a constraint may be added to 
the problem (7) to ensure that the exceedances of a target, *jAAE  for a grid-cell j in a country is 
limited (by a given positive number, hj), thus preventing unintentional environmental “disasters”  
 
 
                                                             
12 In the discussion of emission trading between countries at UN/ECE Task-force level country balances 
opening up for the average target load being violated by a fraction were introduced, see Førsund and Nævdal 
(1998). 
13 To our knowledge weights w kj  have all been set to 1, and zero have been used for country balances B k in 
official scenarios. 
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due to using the mechanism14: 
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                                                                (11) 
This limit may be set uniform for all grids, as in Amann et al. (1998c)15. Note that if the upper 
limits, hj, are set to zero, we are back to model (1). A binding constraint for a grid implies that the 
shadow price is positive, and there will be an extra term in the first order condition (9) consisting 
of the sum of positive shadow prices on (11) weighted with the relevant transportation 
coefficients. The marginal cost will cet. par. increase. However, as noticed above, when one 
country increases purification one or more other countries usually decrease purification, so the 
impacts are not so straightforward to predict. We may have a solution with no binding constraint 
(11) for exceedances of targets. Then at least one country balance constraint must be binding. But 
more interestingly, now we may also have no country balance binding if a constraint (11) on the 
excess over target is binding. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 Note the similarities with mechanisms for emission trading between countries elaborated at UNECE  Task-
force level (see Klaassen et al.,1994).Trade between countries implies that some deposition levels may be 
increased, but various balancing constraints may be added (Førsund and Nævdal (1998)). Ho wever, whereas 
the idea of emission trading was met with hostility the compensation mechanism has been introduced in 
RAINS without much discussion or attention. 
15 The concern expressed by the constraint may also be implemented as an upper (uniform) limit on the 
exceedance of the CL for a percentile (e.g.2%) of the critical load distribution within a grid, see Seventh Interim 
Report. 
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4. The compensation mechanism simulations 
 
Background for the simulations  
In the fifth and sixth interim reports from the TAP project at IIASA, it was suggested that targets 
for acidification should be set differently for Norwegian grids than for grids in the rest of Europe. 
The reason for this is that the cost-minimising strategy for reduced acidification in Europe becomes 
very expensive if the target for relative improvement in two EMEP grids in Southern Norway (with 
grid coordinates 17/19 and 17/20 (the most studied Birkenes grid) in the EMEP model) is the 
same as the targets for relative improvement in the rest of Europe. For ambitious targets it is even 
impossible to obtain the required improvement in the two grids for the abatement strategies 
considered in the RAINS model. As a consequence, there were no targets for acidification in the 
two grids in the scenario called E8/2 of the fifth interim report, while the F8 scenario of the sixth 
interim report required much smaller relative improvement for these grids than for other grids 
(80% versus 95% exceedances gap closure). 
 
One may argue that the targets for reduced acidification in two grids in Norway should have only 
limited influence on the all-European abatement strategy for reduced acidification. On the other 
hand it seems illogical to totally ignore those environmental targets, which are relatively hardest to 
obtain. After all, there are ecological reasons for low critical loads and strict targets for 
acidification in Southern Norway. Therefore, in the wake of these interim reports, it was a strong 
Norwegian interest for sensitivity analyses that could establish reasonable targets for Norway in 
the all-European optimisation.  
 
The settings for the model runs 
The general settings of exogenous variables and parameters in the simulations were quite similar to 
the ones used in the sixth interim report. Therefore, only limited information about the settings are 
presented in this paper. As to gap closure, the gap is the accumulated excess in 1990 (the 
benchmark year), AAE(d1990), minus 5 eq/ha. The subtraction (somewhat ad hoc) was introduced 
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to further relieve the problem of influential grids with low critical loads of the eco-systems. A 95% 
gap closure target is in general the level of accumulated excess that reduces the benchmark 
accumulated excess by 95%. The gap closure share is given by x (see (3)):    
x5))(d()(* 19901990 ×--= AAEdAAEAAE                                                               (12) 
Due to the subtraction of 5 in (12) the gap closure percentage is somewhat less than 95%. 
 
The targets are also influenced by the depositions in a scenario called the reference scenario  
(dREF). In this scenario the emissions are set to the minimum of what is already agreed upon in 
protocols, and in addition calculated using current legislation on emission standards and energy 
projections for the year 2010. If, for a particular grid, the gap closure target in (12) is larger than 
the calculated accumulated excess in the REF scenario, AAE(dREF), then the latter is used as 
target. Also, if the minimum of the gap closure target and the calculated accumulated excess in the 
REF scenario is less than 5 eq/ha, then the target is 5 eq/ha:  
{ }{ }5,)(),1(*minmax* REFdAAExAAEAAE -=                                                          (13) 
Using the compensation mechanism should reduce the influence of single grids like the two 
sensitive Norwegian grids in the optimisation. In addition two other measures were introduced to 
reduce the impact of single grids: Norwegian grids are given a smaller gap closure than other grids, 
and by subtraction of 5 eq/ha in (12) all targets increase with 5x%. This increase in targets might 
reduce the influence of those targets that are hardest to achieve. 
 
Along the lines of the F8 scenario of the sixth interim report, a 95% gap closure is chosen for all 
grids outside Norway. In addition some grids in the North were treated as grids outside Norway 
since Norway touches these grids only marginally. Since all the Norwegian grids are modified, it 
will typically be some violation in the two Southern grids in the optimal solution. This feature might 
be blurred if targets where modified for these grids only. Therefore, all the Norwegian targets are 
modified. The targets in Norwegian grids at different gap closures from 70% to 93% are 
presented in Table 1. Targets that are equal to 5 eq/ha in all gap closure scenarios are not shown. 
Gap closures at 70% and less yields targets corresponding to the REF depositions, while gap 
closures at 93% and more are infeasible. Targets termed base targets are the 1990 accumulated 
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exceedances. Running the optimisation with these targets for the Norwegian grids is defined as the 
base scenario. The influence of setting targets using the rule (13) in Norwegian grids is therefore 
discovered by the difference between the base scenario and the other scenarios. Notice that the 
two problem grids, 17/19 and 17/20, are the ones with the highest excesses and targets of all the 
Norwegian grids (see Table 1). 
 
In principle the abatement costs is minimised subject to the country balance constraints. However, 
in the RAINS model the objective function consists not only of the abatement costs. There is also 
a linear penalty term in violation of targets in grids. In addition there is a regularisation term that 
causes some stability towards a reference level of emissions in  
 
 
 
Table 1. Targets in acidity equivalents per hectare (eq/ha) accumulated excess (AAE) in 
      Norwegian grids  
 
 
Gap closure levels (x) in % of average accumulated exceedances           
Grids 
93 92 91 90 89 87 86 85 80 75 70 
   REF 
2010 
   
Base 
1990 
17/19 63.3 71.7 80.0 88.3 96.7 113.3 121.6 130.0 171.6 213.3 241.2 241.2 838 
16/20 33.2 37.2 41.2 45.2 49.3 57.3 61.3 65.4 79.0 79.0 79.0 79.0 467 
17/20 51.2 57.8 64.4 71.0 77.6 90.7 97.3 103.9 136.9 169.9 199.3 199.3 665 
18/20 36.6 41.1 45.6 50.1 54.6 63.6 68.1 72.6 77.5 77.5 77.5 77.5 456 
15/21 16.7 18.4 20.0 21.7 23.4 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 172 
16/21 14.0 15.2 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 133 
17/21 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 105 
18/21 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 157 
17/23 6.5 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 27 
15/31 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 18 
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case of no unique local optimum16. The values on penalty and stability where set equal to the 
values used in the sixth interim report. The databases on abatement costs, critical loads, 
atmospheric transport coefficients etc. were the state of the art at the TAP project when the 
simulations were performed between the sixth and seventh interim reports. 
 
In accordance with the interim reports, the emissions of  SO2, NOX, VOC  and NH3 are 
constrained to be no larger than the REF- emissions. Notice that these constraints ensure that the 
accumulated acidity excess, caused mainly by SO2 and NOx emissions, is below the AAE(d
REF) in 
all grids. The REF part of targets might therefore seem unnecessary. However, the REF part 
guaranties that contributions compensating for increased depositions elsewhere is only consisting 
of accumulated excess less than the amount corresponding to REF exceedances.  
 
The results of the simulations 
The optimal emissions and control costs for each country are outputs from the simulations, in 
addition to the accumulated excess in every grid. The outputs from the simulations do not show 
which country balances are binding, nor the shadow prices on the binding constraints. We present 
instead the total impacts of different gap closures in the Norwegian grids in Figures 2-4. 
 
Each scenario is labelled according to the gap closure level in the Norwegian grids. The gap 
closure in the Norwegian grids in the scenarios t89 and t90, etc. is 89% and 90% respectively, 
while the gap closure in all other grids is 95% in all scenarios. In Figure 2 we can see that the 
increased gap closure yields increased costs and reduced accumulated excess in Europe. Of 
course, stricter targets in Norway will yield deposition reductions elsewhere in Europe too. The 
largest calculated gap closure is 92% since the 93% gap closure was infeasible. The 75% gap 
closure scenario is close to the base scenario. This might be surprising at first since there are 
                                                             
16 See Makowski et al. (1998) for details. However, the explanations are rather short. It may seem that also 
negative violations of targets are penalized, and the nature of the reference emission levels in the regularization 
term, forcing the solution in case on no unique local optimum, is not elaborated upon.  
 
 
 
24
 
Figure 2: Costs and accumulated excess 
 
substantial differences in targets. However, the emissions are constrained to be no larger than in 
the REF scenario. Therefore, the deposition will never be larger than the depositions in the REF 
scenario. Also, the targets at 75% gap closure are equal to the REF accumulated excesses for all 
grid-cells except 17/19 and 17/20. This explains why the t75 scenario is close to the base 
scenario. Since a 70% gap closure yields REF deposition targets, it is also evident that gap 
closures less and equal to 70% has the same effect as removing the Norwegian grids from the 
optimisation problem. Consequently the Norwegian grids have no impact on the optimisation in 
the base scenario, and changing the targets for the Norwegian grids causes all changes from this 
scenario. At gap closures up to 80%, the targets in Norwegian grids have insignificant impact on 
the optimisation results for costs and exceedances in the rest of Europe. At gap closures between 
80% and 85%, the Norwegian grids have some impact on accumulated excess. However, the 
impact on costs is still insignificant. 
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Figure3: Changes from base scenario 
 
 
It may be more informative as to locating when significant changes occur to look at relative 
changes from the base case. In Figure 3 the percentage changes in European costs and 
accumulated excess are presented. Clearly, the targets for Norwegian grids have impacts on 
accumulated excess if targets are above 80%, the accumulated excess being reduced by 9% going 
for the 85% gap closure, and a further reduction of 11% to the 87% gap closure. But the relative 
cost changes are small up to the 87% gap closure, only 1.3% from the base scenario. So at the 
87% gap closure level, total accumulated excess in Europe is reduced by almost 20% while the 
costs is increased with only 1.3% from the base case. However, starting from 87% gap closure, 
the targets in Norwegian grids have significant impact on costs too, and this impact increases 
rapidly as targets get stricter. From the 87% gap closure to the 89% costs increase with a further 
2.4% while accumulated excess is reduced with additional 10%, but then the costs increase more 
rapidly. To go from the 91% gap closure to the maximal feasible 92% the costs increase with 
15% and accumulated excess is further reduced with 9%. 
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 Figure 4. Estimated shadow price on the Norwegian country balance 
 
 
The change in the objective function when constraints are changed marginally is called the shadow 
price of the respective constraint. In our context the relevant shadow price is the change in total 
costs if the Norwegian country balance is changed marginally. The Norwegian country balance 
must be binding when changing targets for Norwegian grids change the costs and depositions for 
other countries. As pointed out in Section 3 the shadow price on the country balance also 
measures the impact of changing accumulated acidity targets (identical effects for all targets), using 
the envelope theorem (disregarding the limit on exceedances violation and the optional penalty 
term in the objective function of RAINS). Unfortunately, as mentioned above, there is no shadow 
prices reported in the output of the available version of the RAINS model with compensation. 
However, the shadow price on the Norwegian country balance can be average approximated. 
For instance, the shadow price for the 90% gap closure is calculated as the change in costs from 
an 89% gap closure to a 90% gap closure, divided by the change in the Norwegian exceedances, 
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etc. The estimated shadow prices are presented in Figure 4. The shadow price is close to zero at 
gap closures less than 85%. Between 85% and 89% the shadow price increases steadily, while it 
is accelerating from the 89% level, and is increasing with about 160% from gap closure 91% to 
92%. At UN/ECE task force meetings “knuckle points” of total purification cost curves have been 
identified in other contexts and been selected as suitable ambition levels for emission reductions. 
Such a knuckle point seems to be located in the interval of 87 to 89% gap closure for the 
Norwegian grids. Changing the binding targets always yield changed costs and depositions. If the 
distribution of change in costs and accumulated excess where evaluated for all possible target 
combinations in Europe, the mass of information would be unmanageable. The exploring of 
distribution changes caused by targets in single counties might therefore be an unfruitful sidetrack. 
Still, since attention has been focussed on Norwegian grids it may be of interest to  report on the 
distribution of costs increases and environmental benefits in terms of reduced exceedances when 
the Norwegian targets are varied. 
 
In Figures 5 and 6 the relative changes in accumulated excess (AE) and costs compared to the 
base scenario, is  presented for Norway and Europe in total17.  From Figure 5 it is clear that 
Norway only experience approximately the same percentage improvement as the total of Europe 
when the targets in Norwegian grids are taken into consideration. At cap closures between 80% 
and 87% Norway in fact experience less percentage improvement than the total. These results 
might seem strange, but they are quite understandable. UK is for instance a major contributor to 
acidification in Norway. Therefore, the UK emissions are typically reduced when targets are made 
stricter in the Norwegian grids. However, only a small fraction of the UK emissions results in 
depositions in Norway. In fact, the grids in UK benefit much more from reduced UK emissions 
than grid-cells in Norway.  The depositions resulting from UK SO2 emissions for 1990 are 
affecting England most, then Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and to the west Norway, Southern 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Be-Ne-Lux and France and even further westward.  
 
                                                             
17 For theoretical work that explores the effects of changed targets see Wolfgang (2001). 
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    Figure 5: Change in accumulated excess from base case 
 
 
The relative costs changes presented in Figure 6 show that Norwegian abatement costs is 
relatively more sensitive to the targets in Norwegian grids than the total European abatement 
costs. This reflects that a large share of the Norwegian emissions yield depositions in Norwegian 
grids. Norwegian SO2 emissions (in 1990) mainly end up in Norwegian grids. The reduction in 
accumulated excess is about average in Norwegian grids, and the Norwegian costs increase 
relatively more than the total costs in Europe. A claim that the Norwegian targets make the rest of 
Europe pay for environmental improvement in Norway can therefore be questioned. 
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Figure 6. Change in costs from base scenar io 
 
 
 
 5. Conclusions 
 
The original RAINS model has been continuously developed and extended to be able to serve the 
needs of cooperation in Europe to reduce trans-boundary air pollution problems. The model has 
been used for scenario analyses of spatial patterns of pollution not only from acidity, but also lately 
ground level ozone and eutrophication. The optimisation runs to explore cost-effective emission 
reductions have been most influential in choosing an interim strategy for emission reductions 
towards the ultimate goal of keeping loads in Nature within critical loads. 
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The structure of the optimisation model was that European-wide purification costs constitutes the 
objective function, while environmental goals have been entered as constraints. However, 
problems of infeasibility of solutions and solutions driven by a few, or in the extreme, only one 
constraint, lead to the development of several ways to relieve such influence. One such 
development in the focus in this paper was the compensation mechanism. The countries 
negotiating the 1994 Oslo Protocol accepted the interim strategy of closing the gap between some 
benchmark loads on the environment with the same relative factor for all receptors irrespective of 
country, as fair, but when negotiating the Gothenburg Protocol it was accepted to introduce the 
compensation mechanism. This compensation mechanism relaxes the spatial rigidity of the 
environmental constraints within each country. Overshooting a target load at one receptor can be 
compensated by depositing less than the deposition target constraint (but compensation is only 
allowed as long as depositions are above critical loads) in other receptors within the same country. 
As an analogy one can say that the compensation mechanism allows a country emission trading 
between its own receptors (see, e.g., Klaassen et al. (1994) and Førsund and Nævdal (1998) for 
emission trading building on RAINS).   
 
Comparing the basic model without the compensation mechanism and the revised version with the 
compensation mechanism we conclude that in general total purification costs are lower with the 
compensation mechanism, given the same target loads. This is the reward for relaxing a strict 
spatial compliance with the environmental standards. But on the other hand it must be noted that 
targets that were hard or costly to be achieved now are permitted to be exceeded, and the 
compensation gained other places may not be in accordance with environmental preferences. 
Seen from the perspective of emitting countries all receptors of a receiving country with a binding 
country balance constraint have the same shadow evaluation, irrespective of the differences in 
target loads reflecting different environmental sensitivities to deposition, assuming that the “safety 
valve” (11) of restricting exceedances violations is not binding.  The key question is how the 
“hard” constraints are interpreted concerning fairness of interim solutions. Is the spatial rigidity 
really wanted?  If yes then the compensation mechanism should only be used if the nature of an 
“uncompensated” solution raises concerns about the robustness.  The compensation mechanism is 
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an available option in the RAINS optimisation model. Using the compensation mechanism as a 
general standard implies a change in the interpretation of the fairness principle of gap closure, from 
strictly applied to each receptor, to a more relaxed interpretation focussing on each country’s 
deposition balance relative to its deposition targets. 
 
The reason why the Norwegian grids were given special treatment in the use of the RAINS model 
by IIASA was that “hard” targets had “too” large influence on optimisation. However, one must 
accept that they have some influence. After all, the aim cannot be to ignore acidification problems 
in Norway. Historically this problem was one of the main reasons for the European concerns on 
trans-boundary air pollution18. Therefore, taking out Norwegian grids where targets were 
impossible or very expensive to obtain cannot be a satisfactorily approach.  The purpose of the 
compensation mechanism was to treat problem grids in a better way, but this was not enough for 
high ambition levels.  
 
The general approach of the simulations has been to use a range of gap closure values on 
accumulated acidity for Norwegian grids, keeping the gap closure at 95% for al other grids in 
Europe. Our results show that a gap closure of the level of 87% has substantial influence on 
accumulated excess in Europe, but only a small influence on costs. However, from this point on 
the targets have more significant impacts on costs, too. At a gap closure of 89% the change in 
total costs is still below a 4% increase from the base scenario, but the approximated shadow price 
on stricter targets in Norwegian grids accelerates from this level.  There seems to be a “knuckle 
point” on the interval 87 – 89% gap closure. However, a gap closure of  85% was chosen for the 
key scenario (called medium ambition G5/2 in the sixth interim report, or central scenario J1in the 
seventh) of the negotiations with reference to the simulations reported in this paper, although there 
seems to be room for a somewhat higher ambition level. In Amann et al. (1998c) the term cost 
effectiveness of emission reductions seems to be used in the meaning of the reduction in 
exceedances obtained per Euro. The 85% ambition level for the Norwegian grids implies about 
                                                             
18 See Alcamo, Shaw, and Hordijk (1990), chapter 2. 
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the same reduction per Euro of total purification costs as a 95% ambition level elsewhere. 
However, such considerations are not expressed by the model formulation (7). The format is still 
total purification cost minimisation subject to environmental constraints. If other criteria or types of 
cost – benefit considerations are wanted, the model set-up should change accordingly. It is 
difficult to see how different spatial distributions of pollution can be compared without addressing 
the question of how to compare environmental damages at individual grid-calls. It is highly 
unlikely that the environmental damages are uniform across Europe and across different eco-
systems, as implied by focussing on reducing exceedances at the same cost in all grid-cells. 
 
Changing the binding targets always yield changed costs and depositions. If the distribution 
of change in costs and accumulated excess where evaluated for all possible target combinations in 
Europe, the mass of information would be unmanageable. The exploring of distributional changes 
caused by changes of targets in single countries might   therefore be an unfruitful sidetrack, and 
may unduly disrupt the approach of basing calculations on commonly accepted principles of 
fairness. This approach has been used so far in the LRTAP, and it probably reduces the conflict 
level between countries. The compensation mechanism with different gap closure levels between 
countries should therefore be used with caution. 
 
The recent development of the RAINS model with a penalty term in exceedances of targets and a 
stabilisation term added to the objective function, together with the possibility of introducing 
individualised constraints for grids and especially the weighting of exceedances at the grid level, 
and specifying country-specific balance constraints, is transforming the original concept of the 
RAINS model of a clear dichotomy between purification costs and “hard” constraints for 
environmental objectives at grid level into a type of environmental model  found in the economics 
literature based on “damage functions” for environmental effects (see e.g. Baumol and Oates, 
1988). Such a development is, of course, not a problem for economists, but it should be noted 
that operating with a set of coefficients, apparently not based on careful, controllable estimations 
or calibrations, changes a transparent model into an non-transparent one to the detriment of 
insights of persons outside the group of model experts. 
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We will finally give a general warning about using cost benefit arguments for using the 
compensation mechanism to overcome the influence of a few “problem-grids”. A mistake 
sometimes made is to compare the shadow price on a hard constraint with some estimate of the 
environmental damage in the grid in question, and then accepting overshooting of targets if the 
shadow price is (considerably) higher than the environmental damage. The point is that depositions 
are reduced in quite a number of other grids also due to the “problem-grid” constraint being biting. 
A piecemeal grid-by-grid approach to a cost benefit analysis is therefore not to be recommended.  
 
 
References 
 
Alcamo, J. R. and L. Hordijk (eds.)(1991): The RAINS model of acidification. Science and 
strategies in Europe, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Amann, M., J. Bertok, J. Cofala, F. Gyafas, C. Heyes, Z. Klimont, and W. Schöpp (1996): 
 “Cost-effective control of acidification and ground-level ozone”, First Interim Report  
 to the European Commission, DG-XI, IIASA 
 
Amann, M., J. Bertok, J. Cofala, F. Gyafas, C. Heyes, Z. Klimont, M.Makowski,W.Schöpp,  
and S. Syri (1998a): “Cost-effective control of acidification and ground-level ozone”, 
Fifth Interim Report to the European Commission, DG-XI, IIASA. 
 
Amann, M., J.Bertok, J.Cofala, F.Gyafas, C. Heyes, Z. Klimont, M. Makowski, W.Schöpp, and 
S. Syri  (1998b): “Cost -effective control of acidification and ground level ozone”, Sixth Interim 
Report to the European Commission, DG-XI, IIASA. 
 
Amann, M., J. Bertok, J. Cofala, F. Gyafas, C. Heyes, Z. Klimont, M.Makowski,W.Schöpp, 
and S. Syri (1998c): “Emission reduction scenarios to control acidification, eutrophication 
and ground-level ozone in Europe Part B: Emission reduction Scenarios”, Report prepared 
for the 22nd meeting of the UN/ECE task force on integrated assessment modeling, IIASA 
November 1998. 
 
Amann, M, J.Bertok, J.Cofala, F. Gyafas, C. Heyes, Z. Klimont, M. Makowski, W.Schöpp, and 
S. Syri  (1999): “Cost -effective control of acidification and ground level ozone”, Seventh 
Interim Report to the European Commission, DG-XI, IIASA. 
Batterman, S. (1992): “Environmental auditing, optimized acid rain abatement strategies using 
ecological goals”, Environmental Management 16, 133-141. 
 
 
 
34
 
Baumol, W. J. and W. Oates (1988): The theory of environmental policy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (Second edition. First edition 1975). 
 
Eliassen, A. and J. Saltbones (1983): “Modeling of long-range transport of sulphur over Europe: a 
two-year model run and some model experiments”, Atmospheric Environment 17, 1457-1473. 
 
Ellis, J. H. (1988a): “Multiobjective mathematical programming models for acid rain control”, 
European Journal of Operational Research 35, 365-377. 
 
Ellis, J. H. (1988b): “Acid rain control strategies: options exist despite scientific uncertainties”, 
Environmental Science, and Technology 22, 1248 – 1254. 
 
Førsund, F. R. (1998): “Linking RAINS to the economy”, paper prepared for the Task Force on 
Economic Aspects of Abatement Strategies, 14th session, London 2- 4 December 1998. 
 
Førsund, F. R. (1999a): “The optimal emission reduction: General equilibrium and cost benefit”, 
Paper presented at the TFIAM meeting in Les Diablerets 10-12 March 1999. 
 
Førsund, F. R. (1999b): “Modelling transboundary air pollution: the RAINS model approach”, 
Memorandum No 37/99, Department of Economics University of Oslo. 
 
Førsund, F. R. (2000): “An economic interpretation of the compensation mechanism in the 
RAINS model”, Interim Report IR-00-36, IIASA. 
 
Førsund, F. R. and E. Nævdal (1998): “Efficiency gains under exchange-rate emission trading”, 
Environmental and Resource Economics 12, 403-423. 
 
Førsund, F. R. and O. Wolfgang (1998): “The treatment of problematic EMEP squares”, Paper 
prepared for the 22nd meeting of the UN/ECE task force on integrated assessment modeling. 
 
Gough, C. A., P.D. Bailey, B. Biewald, J. C. I. Kuylenstierna and M. J. Chadwick (1994): 
“Environmentally targeted objectives for reducing acidification in Europe”, Energy Policy 22(12), 
1055-1066. 
 
Hettelingh, J. - P., M. Posch, and P. A. M. de Smet (2001): “Multi-effect critical loads used in 
multi-pollutant reduction agreements in Europe”, Water, Air, and Soil Pollution 130,1133-
1138.  
 
Klaassen, G. A. J., F. R. Førsund, and M. Amann (1994): “Emission trading in Europe with an 
exchange rate”, Environmental and Resource Economics 4, 305-330. 
 
 
 
 
 
35
Makowski, M., C. Heyes, and W. Schöpp (1998): “Specification of mathematical model for 
cost-effective control of acidification and ground level ozone”, IIASA Technical Note 1998. 
 
Nilsson, J. (ed.) (1986): “Critical loads for nitrogen and sulphur,” Miljørapport 1986: 11, 
Nordisk Ministerråd/Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
Posch, M., J. - P. Hettelingh and P. A. M. de Smet (2001): “Characterization of critical load 
exceedances in Europe”, Water, Air, and Soil Pollution 130. 1139-1144. 
 
Posch, M., P. A. M. de Smet and J. - P. Hettelingh (1999a): “Critical loads and their 
exceedances in Europe: an overview”, in M. Posch, P. A. M. de Smet, J. -P. Hettelingh and R. J. 
Downing (eds.), Calculation and mapping of critical thresholds in Europe, Status Report 
1997, Coordination Center for Effects, Bilthoven: RIVM, 3-11. 
 
Posch, M., P. A. M. de Smet, J. - P. Hettelingh, R. J. Downing (eds.) (1995): Calculation 
and mapping of critical thresholds in Europe, Status Report 1995, Coordination Center for 
Effects, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven.  
 
Posch, M., P. A. M. de Smet, J.- P. Hettelingh, R. J. Downing (eds.) (1997):  Calculation 
and mapping of critical thresholds in Europe, Status Report 1997, Coordination Center for 
Effects, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven.  
 
Posch, M., P. A. M. de Smet, J.- P. Hettelingh, R. J. Downing (eds.) (1999b):  Calculation 
and mapping of critical thresholds in Europe, CCE Status Report 1999, Bilthoven: RIVM. 
 
Tarrasón, L., A. Semb, A.- G. Hjellbrekke, S. Tsyro, J. Schaug, J. Batnicki, and S. Solberg 
(1998): "Geographical distribution of sulphur and nitrogen compounds in Europe derived both 
from modelled and observed concentrations", EMEP/MSC-W Note 4/98.  
      
Tuinstra, W., L. Hordijk, and M. Amann (1999): “Using computer models in international 
negotiations”, Environment 41(9), 33-42. 
 
Wolfgang, O. (2001): “Eco-correlation in acidification scenarios”, Memorandum No 23/2001, 
Department of Economics, University of Oslo 
 
 
